

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, YAMAZAKI, Takeshi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: The Chief of the General Affairs Department of the House of Representatives, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of one volume, dated 1940, and described as follows: Records of Diet Proceedings Volume 75, Book VIII, Minutes of the Committee (Standing) Meetings of the House of Representatives. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): House of Representatives.

House of  
Signed at Representatives on this  
2nd day of October, 1947.

/signed and sealed/  
YAMAZAKI, Takeshi  
Signature of Official

Witness: Tsuguo TAKEI /signed & sealed/

The Chief of the General  
Affairs Department of the  
House of Representatives  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry SHIMOJIMA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at \_\_\_\_\_ on this  
2nd of October, 1947.

Henry SHIMOJIMA  
NAME

Witness: Johnson F. Munroe /signed/

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

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「ワシントン」文書局 第 三 〇 三 号  
國 際 航 空 部 第 三 〇 三 号

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2000



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千九百四十七年八月二十二日

場所 = 余の居る

警察署長官署

右ノ署ノ公同調査

証人

山崎 高 (中)

家出調査員

武井 次郎 (中)

公衆入手 = 見られし

余、HENRY SHIMOJIMA へ、余の官署、前掲調査  
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シタルモノナルこと、是ニ記されし。

千九百四十七年八月二十二日

場所 = 余の居る

氏 名

右ノ署ノ公同調査

証人

Henry Shimojima

Investigator IPS

Johnson F. Mumor

Doc. 3030, cont. 1

Committee-Member NAKAJIMA: If it is not the whole, about how much more will be introduced according to the plan? All figures just related represent a 4-6 year plan dating from 1940, yet about how many figures will be introduced for the next fiscal year or the year after next? Unless the whole of them is known—On the part of the Navy, ex-Minister of the Navy YONAI revealed the whole amount of naval construction expenditure, and stated plainly that no more than this would be introduced. On the part of the Army also, this is a matter of great importance. Unless the whole is revealed, the people will, even on the basis of deliberation of the budget entertain the apprehension that more budget may be often required. If possible, the whole /amount/ should be made public, and if in the New National Defense Plan the approximate joint Army-Navy sum is revealed...

Last year Minister of War ITAGAKI stated regarding the operations in both the Soviet and China that from the next financial year the whole /amount/ would be made public and that the amount /asked for now/ was only the beginning. In spite of the fact that some ¥2,000,000,000 has already gone out, this is /still/ not the whole /amount/. So, such problems as when the whole /amount/ will be revealed and whether this budget can be really carried out or not are of great importance to the plenary session and this Budget Committee. Notwithstanding, since the whole amount of budget still remains unrevealed, we will fall into great difficulty in judgment in deliberations on the budget so far as concerns the future methods of forming financial plans, the policy of increasing production, and the commodity mobilization plans. In regard to that point approximately from what fiscal year and how much will be introduced.... War Minister: ITAGAKI stated last year that it was now under study and that immediately following the study after the next fiscal year he would reveal this and he would inform the nation of the whole /feature/ of the New National Defense Plan...now what sort of ideas does the War Minister hold?

Minister of State HATA: As you know, international relations are constantly subject to great change but by making a general forecast a general estimate of what international relations would be for the period of the next two or three years was obtained. Based upon this, this plan for the repletion of armaments was formed in view of the international situation and after having made close study of future matters of national defense. To make public the whole /feature/ of this /plan/ is to reveal at once the operational plans of our Army; and it is a matter connected with the Supreme Command. Therefore, I am not in a position to make it public. I beg you to note that it was planned for a period two or three years from now.



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Committee Member ANDO:

"As I have just stated, you stated once again yesterday that it would be announced within the next two or three days. Therefore, I am actually waiting for it. It will appear in the so-called legal forms such as promises or basic agreements. It is a matter of course that I wish to hear this. However, I have just now stated that I should like to know the direction of and the beliefs on its application and management. Taking advantage of this occasion, however, I shall proceed a little further with my question and shall request your all-inclusive answer. It does not necessarily have to be the Premier, but if I could also request an answer from the Premier, it would be satisfactory. I should also like to request a reply from the Foreign Minister, War Minister and others. I am definitely not trying to meddle with the government or indulging in wanton speech. This is not the time for such trifles, nor do I have the leisure for them. Since the people are bewildered I wish to request your answers in as wide a scope as possible and in the proper spirit. It is in his military and financial strength that Mr. Wang Ching-Wei's real strength is said to be poor. Without military strength, peace and order cannot be maintained; without financial strength, administration cannot be carried out. I should like to hear in what way our Government, which has promised to support and cooperate with Wang's regime, is going to cooperate with the latter in regards to military and financial strength. Even if there is an announcement of the agreement within the next two or three days, such matters will not be announced. Although it is all right for me to ask questions after I hear this announcement, it is just that I might not have such an opportunity. Since my turn has come at this time, I am asking this question beforehand.

Japanese cooperation with this military and financial strength is related on the one hand, to the problem of our right to station troops and to the problems of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation and Sino-Japanese joint management on the other. Roughly speaking, the problem of our right to station troops is related to such matters as the extent to which troops are to be stationed, the term of occupation, and the relationship between the troops stationed and the state of public peace and order. The problem of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation is the problem of the joint management of such industries as railroads, harbors, air navigation, postal administration, telegraph and telephone administration and the exploitation of all natural resources. However, since our right to station troops would of course affect the sovereignty and the right of administration of China as would even the industries under the joint management of Japan and China depending on its classification, I think that Mr. Wang Ching-Wei, who is devoting himself to advocating the independence of the sovereignty and the right of administration of China, is assuming a strong attitude without giving consideration to the real strength of his country. No, I have recently heard information from reliable sources. But this is an ironic contradiction, and if Mr. Wang Ching-Wei, swayed by his prestige, persists

stubbornly in his insistence he will not achieve his so-called nation-wide subjugation because there are deficiencies in his real strength. However, if he follows the principle of real strength, his prestige as the leader of the revolution would collapse. Mr. Wang Ching-Wei is caught in this dilemma. But, looking at it from Japan's standpoint, the stationing of troops and the Sino-Japanese joint management of industries are her rights, and in reference to the East Asia cooperative unit, it is her duty which she is obliged to discharge. Therefore, it is needless to say that Japan will of course respect the sovereignty of China. I believe that it is right and proper that Japan, as the strong supporter of the salvation of China and the stabilization of East Asia, should ensure her right to station troops on a very wide scale and acquire a large degree of communications and other industries under the joint management of Japan and China. Otherwise, the central government of Mr. Wang Ching-Wei would, I think, become extremely weak and powerless, and would not be of much service in restoring peace or stabilizing East Asia. Our people are very deeply concerned in this problem. Paying such extreme sacrifices as killing their own children and brothers, they are watching with great deal of concern, its progress, its results, its developments, and the improvement of the national fate of Japan. Therefore, I ask the government to take this opportunity to give an answer as far as circumstances permit with the will to communicate with our people. Since I am afraid that the people's doubts will not be satisfied with just the announcement you plan to issue in the very near future, I am asking you beforehand this question which I previously presented. I request the three ministers to give a detailed reply to what I have just now stated in as wide a scope as possible.

State Minister HATA:

Just now, there was a question from Mr. ANDO concerning the stationing of troops. In the areas concerned, since military operations are now in progress day and night, and since it has a grave influence on the peace and order of the areas concerned, it is, to my regret, not yet the time to say to what extent and how much forces are stationed. However, our Army intends to give military assistance as much as possible to the coming new central government.









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Ж. П. Муромов



Committee Member YUTANI:

In your answer just now, I have understood your feeling of determination to carry it out anyhow, namely, of doing what you will, but do what? In general, what you are going to carry out.....to speak a little more for the convenience of the Prime Minister's answer, for example, you have repeatedly referred to "control", and moreover, the aim of the control has gradually changed since the beginning. The Prime Minister said yesterday evening in reply to the interpellation of the representative of the Shakai-Taishu-To /T.N. the Social Mass Party/, that the control in Japan is "on the tracks now". It may be a track indeed, but the very track may be a terribly dangerous one. If you slightly switch a "point", it's going to cause a disaster more tragic than the one of the "gasoline-car" in Osaka. The mere idealism of "started along the track" is wrong. I trust the Prime Minister's words and sincerely respect your courage and determination with which you intend to do something. But do what and how? I earnestly hope that you will particularly give serious consideration to the aims and the means of the administration. The Prime Minister's answers are very abstract and it is difficult for me to understand what you mean. But as you seem to be in a hurry now, please attend the plenary session. And when you return I will speak to you then. Please go there.

Well, I will change the subject of my interpellation now. Analyzing the answers which I have received from the Minister of Commerce and Industry and some question which I have not yet asked, but intend to interpellate to the Finance Minister, we notice the following fact that the financial economy of Japan, in a word, is endlessly slipshod and always not thorough. Such is the state of things. Do you think the national structure as it is, becoming to Japan at war? I am going to interpellate a little more from this point. Well, I want the clarification on the views of the government. Now I think we should reflect strictly on the Sino-Japanese Incident. We must re-examine the initial stage of the incident. The last European War took almost five years. However, if you examine the policies adopted by the belligerent countries you will learn that both Britain and Germany resorted mainly to the hand to mouth policies. I suppose that there was no one, at the beginning, who predicted that war would last as long as five years. If I am not mistaken, it is said that Marshall KITCHENER of Britain once said it would last for three years, but, for the government and military authorities of the belligerent countries it was a matter of beyond expectation that it would continue for five years. Therefore, everything they do, especially the establishment and strengthening of the wartime national structure were nothing but a makeshift measure, and when the war ended and they looked back upon the progress of the war, they realized it had lasted for five years after all. There is a research in which it is argued that if the war was to be fought for five years, they should have set up a solid counter-plan at the beginning, and then it

might have ended in two or three years. I assume that men who have ever made any research are acquainted with this but ——. Well, how was the circumstances in Japan? If it were the days in July, 1937, shortly after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident had broken out, it might have been settled by localizing the affair and settlement on the spot, as declared by the Cabinet at that time, but the hostilities had already spread to Shanghai, and then to Central China. It is a matter of course that, in such a case, a thorough counter-plan based on the insight into the future development of the incident should be set up. However, the government authorities at that time could not see through the general situation regarding to what extent the battle areas would spread and how many years the hostilities would last. There were no counter-plans made taking into consideration the adequate safety ratio. When we reflect the above facts we are extremely indignant and feel a great anxiety concerning the incapable upper and leading class of the Japanese Government. For instance, as to this wartime structure of the present Cabinet for the most part, it is, after all, nothing but the inheritance left by the former Cabinet. I think the words "to succeed to the budget" /T.N. of the former Cabinet/ is too grave to hear as a mere sarcasm. What we have understood now is .... we cannot help but be doubtful that when the China Incident broke out, the KONOYE Cabinet laid the wartime plan probably at first thought that this incident would be settled in a year and a half or two years at the most. But what is done is done. However, at least, it is the mission and the responsibility of this Cabinet to re-establish the wartime structure based on good anticipation and adequate planning against the long-term war to come. This is a matter of importance. I assume you have learned of, in special magazines on this particular subject and by other means, what Germany and Britain did immediately after the present European War had broken out. When we compare the actual wartime policies of the above countries with the wartime policy of Japan which has fought for four years, we feel that it is necessary for us to reflect ourselves strictly. We must consider matters seriously. Gasoline is still being consumed lavishly. It is always said that there are very little gold in Japan, yet, in fact, we are allowed to possess gold, and if we sell gold to the government, we do so only from our moral sense. When Chiang Kai-Shek, the enemy of Japan, enforced the circulation of the Chinese currency, he carried out the collection of silver, which was not so lukewarm and halfway as the gold collection campaign in Japan. There are no established measures for the necessities of life. So our people under the national emergency were compelled to put up with so much inconveniences that they cannot devote themselves to the national policies. They are compelled to give their whole attention to their livelihood. Blackmarketing is a shameful conduct under the wartime structure, but, in some cases, it is a means of self-defense for the people who have lost their confidence in the government, and its policies for the necessities of life. There is a necessity for the government to think this over carefully. They are upset, at this time, confronting the problems of coal and electricity which are the key to increased production. Is this the wartime structure of Japan? This is the problem. As Mr.



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YONAI has gone, it is useless saying this, but I want members of the Cabinet to consider this matter fully from the standpoint of state ministers. What we are now worried about above all is the fact that there might be existing a feeling to regard that the European War is providence, and feel they are somewhat relieved. This inclination must be absolutely rejected. How long will the European War last, which is regarded as providence by some people? I believe it is necessary for Japan to think carefully, taking the contrary possibilities into consideration, that the war may end sooner than we expect. Is the government ready for such a situation? When we think of all this, the inevitability of a complete wartime structure becomes obvious. I am often told that even if the Wang Government is realized and a peace agreement is concluded, the war will not come to an end, which I think is quite right. The wartime structure of Japan should now be earnestly started afresh. I want to learn of the War Minister's opinion concerning our view.

State Minister HATA:

I think that it is absolutely necessary for the Army to all the more strengthen the structure of the national mobilization in order to carry out this holy war.

C E R T I F I C A T EStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, Takashi Yamazaki, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Director of General Affairs of the Secretariat of the House of Representatives, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 1940, and described as follows: Minutes (Shorthand) No. 7 (dated Feb. 10, 1940) of the meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives in the 75th Session of the Imperial Diet. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): \_\_\_\_\_

Signed at the House of  
Representatives on this

11th day of August 1947.

Witness: Tsugio Takei /sgd/ (seal)

/sgd/ Takashi Yamazaki (seal)

Director of General Affairs  
Division of the Secretariat  
of the House of Representatives  
OFFICIAL CAPACITY

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry A. Dolan, Jr., hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
14 day of Aug. 1947.

Witness: /sg/ J. F. Munroe

/sgd/ Henry A. Dolan, Jr.  
NAME

IPS, INV. DIV.  
Official Capacity



據傳委員會議錄第七回 昭和十五年三月十日

Doc. 3030-D

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用シテ、斷乎ト云フニ云フ、其ノ勇氣、決心、商、概意ヲ拂ヒセウ。  
然ラハ何ヲアルデ、如何ニシテ之ヲ行フデ、此、政治、内容政治、手  
段ニ對シテハ餘程眞剣ト御考フニテ下サルコトヲ痛感スルニテ、ト云  
フ總理大臣、御答ハ非常ニ拙家論カ多ク、其ノ正体ヲ掴ム  
ニ苦シムデスガ、御氣持、ヤウニテスカラ、此、場合本會議、オニ、  
ソニテ、戰、テ、ア、ラガ御歸リニテ、カラ話ヲ致スコトニ致ミセウ、ト云  
フ御出張願ヒス。

No. 1

ソコテ私ハコト質問、方同リ撥入ヲ行フデ、今、商工大臣ニ承  
メ、ト云フ或ハ、申シマセ、大藏大臣ニ聴カントシテ居ルコト、斯ウ云フ  
ノ質疑内容ヲ進メテ行ツテ、令ルコトハ、言マシ、日本、財政經濟、  
ルモ、何處デモ、ラ、テ、何、時、中、途、半、端、ス、斯ウ云フ、  
ト、テ、ス、戰、争、日、本、國、内、体、制、ハ、果、テ、是、デ、宜、イ、カ、私、此、目、標  
カラ、少シ、質問、進メ、ヨウ、思、フ、デ、ス、レ、テ、政、府、所、信、ヲ、明、カ、ニ、シ、  
テ、ス、ガ、茲、テ、吾、ハ、日、本、事、業、ニ、對、ス、ル、嚴、正、ト、同、願、ガ、必、要、ト、思、フ、デ、ス。

事変當初ハ吾ハ再吟味ラ加ヘルコトガ必要ト思フ此ノ前ノ歐羅  
巴戰爭ハ足掛ケニ當年掛リマシテ所カ交戦各國ガ之ニ對シテ執  
ツテ政策ヲ跡ヲ見ルト實ハ英利吉モ獨逸モ其ノ日暮ニシテカワ  
テス最初カラ戰爭ガ五年モ掛ルナドト云フ豫言者ハナカワラセウ  
速カ英國ハ「キンナー」元帥ガ三年掛ルナドト云フ話ハアルガ交戦  
各國ノ政治當局或ハ軍部當局セデモウ五年掛ルナドト云フ豫想ハ  
ニテカワラウト思フソコデアルコトス。特ニ國戰時體制ノ建設強  
化ト云フ問題ハ其ノ日暮ニ過ギタルソコデ戰爭ヲ済シテアラ其ノ戰爭  
跡ヲ振歸シテ見ルト結局五年モ掛ルノ戰爭ガ五年モ掛ルナドト云  
カラハワキリシテ對策ヲ執ルハ宜リワラズヤカ執リテ置ケバ戰爭ジモ  
二三年デ済ヌウモ知リス斯ウ云フ研究ガ出来テ居リマス是ハ少シ勉  
強シテ人間ハ知リテ居ルデセウガ。所テ日本ノ情勢ハドウウ十二年  
七月盧溝橋ニ事變ガ起ツテ當初ニラバ或ハ時兩國關係ガ至大  
變遷ヲ遂ゲテ済ムヲ知シマセアルトモ該ニ戰爭ハ上海ニ發展シテ  
中ニ發展シテ斯ウ云フ場合ニナレバモウ事變ニ對スル見透ミヲ  
付ケテ是ガ徹底セル對策ヲ講ゼバナラナイコトハ當然デテワラナ  
ス然レニ戰闘區域ハ何處ニテ擴大スルカ何年位掛ルカニ付テハ時  
政府當局ハ大局ヲ見透シラシテ待ナカワラ相當ノ安全率ヲ考慮  
ニシテタル對策ガナカワラデス斯ウ考ヘテ来ルト吾ハ日本ノ政治上  
層支配階級ノ貧弱ヲ國家ノ爲ニ哀カラ憤慨シ憂慮スルノ  
デスガ例ハ此ノ内閣ノ戰時體制ト云フモノモ結局前ノ内閣ノ遺  
産ヲ多ク御相續ニシテ過ギナリ豫算ノ踏襲ト云フ言葉ハ  
是ハ一ツ皮肉ノ言葉トシテ聞クベク私ハソノ意義ヲ非常ニ重大ナ  
ク今日吾々が命ツキトハ最初近衛内閣ニ支那事變勃発



當時考へたコトハ此一事變ハ精々二年位デ片付ヤウナ  
持下ニ戰時計畫ヲ御ヤリニナワタデヤナカト疑ハサルヲ得ヌデス  
併シ是ハ濟ンズコトデスカラハ方イリマセヌアリマセヌガ少クモ此内閣  
使命此内閣ノ責任ハ是カラ先長期戰ニ對應スベキ相當ナ見透  
シト相當計畫ニ依ツテ戰時体制ノ再建設ガナラナラヌ此問題  
デス既ニ專門ノ雜誌其他テ御承知モゴザイマセウガ今度、政羅  
巴戰爭デ此戰爭ノ直接ニ獨逸、シタコト英國、ヤッコト此實  
際戰時政治ト戰爭シテウラモウ四年モ經ツテ居ル日本、戰時政  
治ト之ヲ比ベテ見ル時ニ吾ハ非常ナ反省ヲ要ナサレテ居リス、哀  
心カラ考ヘナラナラヌ、カソリンハマダフンタンニ使ハレテ居リマス、金ガ  
無イ、ト言ヒナガラ實ハ金所持ガ許サレル唯道德的ニ政府  
賣ルニシカ過キヌ日本、敵タル蔣介石ハ例、法幣ヲ實行シ時  
現銀ノ回收ヲヤリマシタガ其ヤリナリ、如キ今日日本、金ノ回收運動  
、ヤウナ左様ナ生温、左様ナ不徹底ナモ、デヤナラフ、生活ニ需  
品對策ハ確立シテ居リマセヌ、デカラ非常時國民ハ國策ニ專念ス  
ルコトガ出来ヌト云フ大キナ不便モ其員ハサレテ居リマス、自今ノ生  
活ニ没頭セヌケレバナラヌ、闇取引ハ戰時体制ノ恥曝シテハアリマス  
ケレドモ、政治ノ信用ヲ失ヒ、政府ノ生活必需品對策ニ安心ガ  
持ヲナシ國民トシテハ、闇取引モ或ル場合ニ自己防衛ニデス  
政府トシテハシワカリ考ヘル必要ガアリマスヨ、生産擴充ノ基礎タル  
石炭電氣ノ問題、今頃ウロケ廻ル、是ガ日本、戰時体制カ、  
此問題ナリデス、米内サシガ居テウナワカラハ仕様ナリデスカ、閣僚  
諸公ハ國務大臣ノ立場ニ於テシワカイト御考ヘテ願ツテ置キナリ、特ニ  
吾ガ最近非常ニ心配シマス、今度、政羅巴戰爭ヲ天祐

1900. 3030-D

ダト考ヘテ一日、安キヲ備ヘヤウナシ持アリハニキイカト云フコトナシス絶  
對ニ排撃ヲ受ケレバナラヌ一休一部ノ人々が天祐ト時ハ所、歐羅巴戦争  
ハ何時ニ續クノニテ日本トニテハ是ハ安全率ヲ逆ニ取ツテ  
案外早ク済カモ知ラヌト云フ立場カラシマリ考ヘル必要ガアルト  
思フ。是等ニ對スル政府ノ用意ハ出来テ居ルハナラウカ斯ウナリ  
来ルト愈ハ徹底シテ戰時体制、必然性ガハキリニテ參ルト考ル  
ニ政権ガ出来テ假ニ和平條項ガ結バレテモ戦争ハ済ハシヤナ  
イト云フコトハ屢々聞イテ居リマス、其ノ通りダト考ヘル日本、戰時  
体制ハ是カニ再々是カラ真創ニヤリ直シラセヌケレバナラヌ此  
私共ノ考ヘ方ニ付テ陸軍大臣カラツ、御所信ヲ承リタイ。

○ 畑國務大臣 陸軍トニミテハ此聖戰ヲ遂行スル爲ニ國內  
總動員ノ体制ヲ益々強化スルコトガ絶對ニ必要ナルト考ヘテ  
居リマス。



190c. 3030-D

# 證明書

ワシントン、文書局 第 號

國際檢察部 第 號

## 典據及公正に關スル證明

余、山崎 高、余が下記資格に於て、即ち衆議院庶務部長トシテ、日本政府ト公約關係ニ在ルモノナルコト並ニ該官吏トシテ余が茲ニ添附セラレタル 頁ヨリ成ル千九百四十七年、昭和十五年ノ 附下記題名、即ち第七回帝國議會衆議院予算委員會會議録速記第七回昭和十五年二月十日、文書、保管ニ在リ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余、更ニ添附、記録及文書が日本政府、公文書ナルコト、並ニ右下記名稱、省入、部局、公式書類及綴一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。若シテ綴番号又引用其他公式書類又綴ニ於ケル該文書、正規所在、公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ。


千九百四十七年ノ昭和二十一年ノ八月十一日

衆議院ニ於テ署名


當該官吏署名欄

右有公約資格

證 人

山崎 高 

衆議院庶務部長

武井 次男 

## 公式入手に關スル證明

余、ハ余が聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、並ニ上記題名、文書が余が公務上、日本政府、上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證

No. 5

Doc. 3030-D

明<sup>ス</sup>。

千九百四十七年／昭和二十二年／八月十四日

Tokyo = 於<sup>ニ</sup>署名

氏名 欄

右、者、公の資格

證人

Harry Dolan

I. P. S. Sec. Div. 國務院秘書處

J. F. Munroe

Doc. 3030-D



C E R T I F I C A T EStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, Takashi Yamazaki, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Director of General Affairs Division of the Secretariat of the House of Representatives, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 1940, and described as follows: Minutes (Short-hand) No. 8 (dated Feb. 12, 1940) of the meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives in the 75th Session of the Imperial Diet. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): \_\_\_\_\_

The House of  
Signed at Representatives on this

11th day of August, 1947.

/sgd/ Takashi Yamazaki (seal)

Director of General Affairs  
Division of the Secretariat  
of the House of Representatives  
Official Capacity

Witness: /sgd/ Taueio Takei (seal)

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry A. Dolan, Jr. hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
14 day of Aug. 1947.

/sgd/ Henry A. Dolan, Jr.  
NAME

Witness: J. F. Munroe /sgd/

IFS, INV. DIV.  
Official Capacity

Member of the Committee MAKINO:

I should like to ask questions on several points which are important from the standpoint of determining our attitude towards the budget. To begin with, according to what I have been told about the policy in the drawing up of the budget for the next fiscal year, it has been made clear, by the government's statements and the general outline of the budget, that in regards to the drawing up of the budget for the fiscal year of 1940, emphasis would be placed on the attainment of the settlement of the Incident, and the completion of military preparations, expansion of production and the control of the economy would be made the focal points. Up until now, however, there have already been repeated important questions and answers of various nature concerning the attainment of our objectives in the Incident, expansion of production, and the control of the economy. However, as to the military budget, especially the contents of the budget for the completion of military preparations, I have not as yet heard anything. It is needless for me to say that the expenditure for completing national defense is the most important point in the contents of the general budget for the fiscal year of 1940. For this reason, the day before yesterday, it was decided that we should induce Mr. MIYOSHI to request the War Minister for an explanation to the extent necessary for a deliberation on the budget, and I requested Mr. MIYOSHI to make an inquiry to this effect. However, we have been unable, as yet, to obtain any explanations from either Ministers concerning the contents. In accordance with the purpose of Mr. MIYOSHI's question, I would like to request at this time, an explanation to the extent that we would be able to criticize the matter of completing military preparations.

Minister of State HATA:

As I have often said previously, the Army's plans for armament are calculated to be generally completed by about 1943, and it is to be armament on a minimum scale. As for the contents, it is entrusted to the Supreme Command, and therefore I am unable to give an explanation here.



Committee-Member MAKINO:

Then I shall speak as time allows. Just now I received an obliging interjection from the Overseas Minister. Allow me to comply with it. It seems to me the mentality and attitude of the Overseas Minister ought to be also those of the Army authorities. That would be good. We are not asking the number of airplanes, guns, and increased personnel, only why the increase is necessary. If the increase is made to this amount, the responsibility for maintaining national defense can be fixed. By keeping this in mind, when they /Army authorities/ say that another increase is necessary, in view of what the situation may be two or three years hence, we desire to avail ourselves of data to clarify what that responsibility was by comparison with the /present/ reference. Such budgets are carelessly made and submitted, but an attitude of considering only two or three years is wrong. I want to say that in the presence of the Overseas Minister. Generally speaking, the reason why such an attitude has recently been adopted originates from the marked tendency of the Army to take the leading role in government. Therefore, speaking more candidly about national uneasiness, we must take into consideration the conclusion that the Army should get out of politics. Although skilled military men may do anything anywhere, the fact that they get into political circles under the stress of active service in the Army threatens the nation to a great degree. I am not making sarcastic or ironical remarks. The whole nation trusts the Army in the matter of war.

Chairman MITSUCHI:

Mr. MAKINO, I think you are getting off the subject a little .....

Committee Member MAKINO:

I may be getting off the subject, but in compliance with the interjection of the Overseas Minister who now answered as a state minister .....  
(Laughter) (Shouts of: "What's interjection to a committee-member?")

Chairman MITSUCHI:

I think it is not a matter of interjection. I intended to speak before the Overseas Minister did, but .....(Shouts of: "Don't be impertinent!")

Committee Member MAKINO:

It might be a little impertinent, but .....

Chairman MITSUCHI:

I intended to investigate the point MAKINO wanted to know about and then press the War Minister. Gathering from the speeches just made, there will arise various problems when details are touched upon, as the Overseas Minister has said. The War Minister will not be able to give concrete details, I think, because, as he says, we are now in war and similar international situations. It might be well if the War Minister were to speak in the same way as the Overseas Minister just did.

Committee-Member MAKINO:

That's right!

Chairman MITSUCHI:

Now, let us break off this discussion.

Committee-Member MAKINO:

Then, I should like to speak about why the War Minister cannot say anything though the Overseas Minister can. However, the atmosphere of the hall prevents so I shall put a stop to my remarks at this point.



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The House of  
Signed at Representatives on this

11th day of August 1947.

/sgd/ Takashi Yamazaki (seal)  
Signature of Official

Witness: sgd/ Tsugio Takei (seal)

Director of General Affairs  
Division of the Secretariat  
of the House of Representatives  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry A. Dolan Jr., hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

14 day of Aug. 1947

/sgd/ Henry A. Dolan, Jr.  
NAME

Witness: J. F. Munroe

IPS INV. DIV.  
Official Capacity

Acting Chairman of the Committee NAKAMURA: Mr. HOSHI, Hajime

Committee-Member HOSHI:

My questions concern the wartime Diet /assembled/ for the preservation of everlasting stability in East Asia and the establishment and strengthening of the wartime structure. These questions, I shall ask the Prime Minister and the War and Navy Ministers, who took up 80 per cent of the budget. The question of the improvement of the Cabinet Planning Board which is functioning like the League of Nations which maintains the status quo; this I ask of the Prime Minister. In order to make perfect the Material Mobilization Plan, the encouragement of inventions, with the idea of fair distribution to the people for their war time services, the guarantee of freedom of action to manufacturers and dealers, the unification of imports, the simplification of distribution, and the temporary government management of essential private industries; on these subjects I shall make inquiries to the Minister of Commerce and Industry. Land transportation and sea transportation during the temporary period of government management; on these subjects I shall make inquiries to the Minister of Railways, and the Communications Minister. Next, the appropriation of expenditures for the Army abroad by the Overseas Affairs Ministry; this I shall ask the Overseas Affairs Minister. The floating of bonds which cannot be discounted, mortgaged, sold, or transferred and whose purpose lies in the educating of succeeding generations; on this subject I shall ask the Finance Minister. The establishment of an independent Police Ministry to meet the changes -- these changes will be explained later; on this subject I shall make inquiries to the Home Affairs Minister. The requirement of students to complete a year's practical study before entering technical colleges, and the fundamental reformation of school education; on these I shall make inquiries to the Education Minister. To cease using the expression "independent diplomacy", and replacing it with the expression "self-supporting and cooperative diplomacy", this I ask the Foreign Minister. The population problem and the transfer of jurisdiction over pharmaceutical products except serums to the Commerce and Industry Ministry; on these I ask the Welfare Minister. The improvement of courts -- the court is, in my opinion, partly responsible for the demoralization of the people -- on this subject, I shall make inquiries to the Justice Minister. As my time is limited to one hour, my explanations shall be in outline form in order to shorten the explanation of each item. There might be discourtesies in my speech, but I shall ask your forgiveness. Moreover, if my explanation falls too short, I request you to use your own judgment.

When we refer to the Imperial rescripts concerning the China Incident, in the Imperial rescript on the opening ceremony of the 72nd Session of the Diet it says:



"I wish that the Imperial subjects, in view of the present situation, will serve the public faithfully, and will assist in concert with each other to accomplish our expected objectives."

I deem the Imperial rescript is also directed to the Japanese subjects in general. We members of the Diet were given the order, "You understand my intention completely. Make efforts to discharge your duty of assisting my Imperial Rule in cooperation with each other." In the Imperial rescript for the 73rd Session of the Diet he said, "Relying on the loyalty of my subjects throughout the country, I expect to attain promptly the ultimate object." He has used the word, "expect". Furthermore, to us members of the Diet, he said, "I wish that considering the gravity of the present situation you will discharge the duties of helping the conduct of state affairs after a harmonious deliberation." In the Imperial Rescript on the occasion of the first anniversary of the China Incident, he said, "Unless we eliminate the root of many years' evil at this time, I think we will not be able to hope for the attainment of everlasting stability in East Asia. Making firm the Sino-Japanese cooperation, and thus bringing co-prosperity to light is truly a contribution to the establishment of world peace," and "unless we should eliminate the root of many years' evil at this time." In the Imperial rescript for the 74th Session of the Diet, he said "My officers and men have admirably overcome difficulties and have pacified and secured important parts of China. However, in order to establish a new order in East Asia and to preserve everlasting stability in East Asia, we must depend upon the enhancement of our national spirit and the full display of our national strength." And in his speech for the 73rd Session, he said, "Relying on the faith of my subjects throughout the country, I expect to attain our anticipated objectives." In the Imperial rescript for this Session, he said, "A war has suddenly broken out in Europe and the world situation has become extremely complicated. It is expected that the convictions of the Japanese Empire would be carried out and our best efforts expended in accomplishing the stabilization of East Asia, after the actual world situation is closely examined and the replenishment of our national strength is planned. In viewing this Diet, I wonder if this Diet is really abiding by these Imperial rescripts. I am now going to speak on this point, and I should like to request answers to the question I presented at the beginning. What is war? Is the meaning of war understood? I am of the opinion that besides tactics and strategy there exists a science of war. As my time is limited, I will make omissions, but in regards to war, it is 'change' to which most careful attention must be drawn. It is change at home and abroad, and to the present and the future. Men and materials are essential for war. We must understand peacetime affairs. If emphasis is placed only on material, it will leave behind the roots of evil. The idea of annual budgets — I think that this idea of annual budgets is an animal instinct. We have a Japanese instinct. I think, that this /Japanese instinct/ must be demonstrated in this Incident. The past, present and the future of the Sino-Japanese Incident must be examined. It is a mistake to believe that

Chiang Kai-Shek's anti-Japanese /actions/ were the cause of the present Incident. If the distant past is omitted, and we consider the Mongolian Invasion, the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the dispatch of troops to Tsingtao, the dispatch of troops to Siberia, the League of Nations, the renunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Nine-Power Treaty, the Manchurian Incident, the establishment of the Chinese-dollar, /the establishment of the Chinese dollar — I intentionally repeat it —, the North China Incident and the Sino-Japanese Incident, we shall find that these are all events which have arisen from the time the State was founded. Therefore, a great war is being waged on a large scale since the foundation of the country. Whether we like it or not, we have faced it. This must be continued forever. This is fate; this is our mission! After the 72nd Diet Session of December, 1937, I went to Peking. It was said that all professors of colleges in Peking had insisted on the opening of war. It is said that these professors believed that if things went on as they were, China would forever be conquered by Japan and that since they urged the commencement of war on this occasion, the war had been started. I think that the clamor for a long-term construction is indeed the expression of our Japanese instinct. Is it not necessary, on this occasion, to restore and utilize this Japanese instinct? The settlement of the Incident and the 'long-term construction' are one and the same. These are indivisible. We have achieved a great victory unparalleled in the world. No other country has ever had such a great victory. This is a victory which has left us the great reserve of our Navy. Now, all of us must consider the fact that Japan has great strength. She has the power which no other country in the world possesses. I think that if we review the problems now under heated discussion in this Diet Session from a slightly different point of view, it will dawn upon us like the loud peal of thunder that if the people are united under the Emperor with unity of mind, we will be lacking in nothing. If there is a country which does not want to sell, there is no necessity of our buying from them. Ours is a country that can, with determination, exist without purchasing. Furthermore, it is a mistake to think that we must buy. It is also a mistake to say so. I think that it is probably permissible to make purchases and sales after deciding not to buy. In this Diet Session, there is no mention of the words, 'long-term construction'. The words 'long-term construction' is lacking. Where has the China Incident progressed? Who can say that there will be no Chinese counter-attacks or revenge? I think that even a child can understand this. It is natural that we should be resigned to this. In four thousand years, they have had more than thirty rises and falls of dynasties. The prevention of their repeating their history is the preservation of everlasting stability in East Asia mentioned in the Imperial rescript. This is what is called the holy war. The holy war must be for the prevention of the repetition of their past history. Giving and establishing for them Confucianism, which is the basis of Chinese families, society and their state system, the order advocated by this Confucianism, government officials indoctrinated with Confucianism, are the ways to help China. We have no territorial ambition. We must forever win over the minds of the Chinese people. There exists no country other than Japan which can



save China. I believe that if Confucius were to come back to life now and view Manchuria, he will express his gratitude to Japan saying that this is the realization of his ideal. However widely the battlefields may be extended, there should have been a possibility of settlement in the areas concerned. If the disputes are brought to settlement one by one, the war will not be expanded. How many years did both YUAN and CHING take in unifying China from the outside? How many years did MING who was produced by China herself, take in this unification? I think that we had better study history. Soldiers returning from the front are crying out to their children and their descendants that the war must never be lost. I think that there is much for us to learn from the withdrawal from Korea, by Taiko Hideyoshi /T.N. feudalistic ruler of Japan/ and the withdrawal of troops from Siberia. History shows that gaining a victory is not so difficult, but it is the maintenance of the victory that is difficult. Without the maintenance of victory, everlasting stability cannot possibly be ensured. I think that the will to ensure permanent stability in East Asia, which is stated in the Imperial Rescript, is not yet implanted in the people. I believe that the system for the establishment of such a will is not yet formed. I intend to ask questions including the following items. I make inquiries to the Prime Minister and to the War and Navy Ministers who have taken up 80 per cent of the budget for war expenditures. The wartime Diet, and your beliefs concerning the establishment and strengthening of wartime organization; on these two points I shall ask questions. There are some civilians who say that this war is being fought as a side-line, that the Finance Ministry is waging war as a side-line, and that only a part of the people are carrying on this war. However, this is an emergency. A slight change from peacetime would be insufficient. I think that it would be better for the government to directly execute the plan for the mobilization of materials. I believe that a fair distribution must be made for the services of the people and we must induce them to save it for their children. Setting aside the judgment as to whether it is good or bad, the U.S., upon its entry in the European War, has imposed a prohibition on liquor. She has also advocated one Tsubo farming/T.N. One Tsubo is approximately 36 sq. ft./, and although it was later restored to private ownership, the railroads were temporarily under government management. Furthermore, by selling 25 cents stamps, she succeeded in floating small denominational bonds by one billion dollars in one year. I believe Japan is carrying out an economic principle that is most liberalistic in the world. Compared with the U.S., although the people of the U.S. have freedom of speech, they do not have freedom of action. They are under rigid control. It seems as though controls cannot be imposed if freedom of speech is suppressed. For this reason, I should like to ask if it would be feasible to form a principle here by having a continuous day and night discussion with the Diet members in a session closed to the public. An agreement with the members of the Diet means an agreement with the people. The Diet must be the one for the establishment of permanent stability in East Asia. This is a constructive Diet, and if we become angry or laugh in this Diet, the construction cannot be accomplished. We must weep; only by appealing with tears can this construction be accomplished. In China, it is said that if Japan should make

a protest to Britain, she would answer that if Japan is going to make such a demand, Britain has no alternative but to solve the situation by actual force. Before saying whether Britain and the U.S. are right or wrong, I should like to ask whether we have any defects which causes them to protest or any defects which they despise. Japan is a country of sincerity. The diplomacy of Japan's government and people are both poor. Japan is poor in expressing their sincerity. Yet, Japan is a country of sincerity. In the expression of sincerity, real ability is necessary. Sincerity lacking in force means nothing. In view of the grave situation, after making the Diet of national loyalty as expressed in the Imperial Rescript and with the mutual embracement of Cabinet members and members of the Diet, I, with tears in my eyes earnestly wish to hold a discussion on the organization of the Diet. I think that this is the time in which we should cling on the banks of river Isuzu (near Ise shrine, the cradle of Japanese nation) and cry to our hearts content. Our tearful voices are voices which can be heard by our ancestors and which should reach the ears of our descendants. I want the government to realize that our tearful voices are voices to check the weeping by our descendants. I think there are some deficiencies in the government's policies concerning the Diet and in its establishment and strengthening of the wartime system. We members of the Diet have complied with the Imperial wish stated by the Emperor and have impressed it deep down in our hearts. We, in compliance to the Imperial will, are ready to cooperate with the government. I should like to ask the Prime Minister and the Army and Navy Ministers whether or not the government, in accordance to my wishes, has the intention of forming a wartime Diet or establishing and strengthening wartime organizations.

State Minister YONAI:

Although I did not hear the beginning of Mr. HOSHI's address, I fully understand the feelings he has expressed. The government, also, in order to cope with this incident, is dealing with it with a most solemn feeling. Next, as for the problem of wartime organizations, as I have often stated, I fully recognize the need for the completion and strengthening of wartime organization in every field.

State Minister HATA:

HOSHI's question, just now, seems to be that present social conditions and the state of the Diet require further consideration and that there truly exists the need for placing them under the so-called wartime system. It is needless for me to say that our empire is presently confronted with a truly critical situation. I entirely agree with his view that in order to conquer this difficult situation at this juncture, there is a necessity for placing all politics, economy and education under the wartime system. We also do not think that the present domestic social conditions of our country at large is in a satisfactory state. I can not but earnestly hope that everything will be conducted under the belief that persons at home and soldiers at the front are equally engaged spiritually and materially in a holy war with the same feelings.

Ministers  
I wish to express my sincere wishes for the formation of a wartime Diet and strengthening of wartime organizations.



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. \_\_\_\_\_

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Takashi Yamazaki hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Director of General Affairs Division of the Secretariat of the House of Representatives, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 1940 and described as follows: Minutes (Shorthand) No. 10 (dated Feb. 14, 1940) of the meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives in the 75th Session of the Imperial Diet. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): \_\_\_\_\_

Signed at the House of Representatives  
on this 11th day of August, 1947.

/s/ TAKASHI YAMAZAKI (SEAL)  
Signature of Official

Witness: Tsugio Tokai (SEAL)

Director of General Affairs  
Division of the Secretariat of  
the House of Representatives  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry A. Dolan, Jr., hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
14th day of Aug., 1947.

/s/ HENRY A. DOLAN, JR.

N.M.E.

Witness: J. F. MURPHY /s/

IFS Inv. Div.

Official Capacity

Doc. No. 1030-H  
16th Meeting of the Budget  
Committee - 23 March 1940/

Committee-Member YAMAMOTO:

Setting aside SAITO's problem, I put a question about the government's attitude towards world policy. Japan's advocacy of southward or northward advance has been discussed for a fairly long time. Especially, it is historically clear that the advocacy of the Korean Invasion was discussed in conjunction with advocacy of the so-called southward or northward advance. It is historically clear that Prince ITO, Hirofumi, later advocated the southward advance, that Prince KATSURA advocated the southward advance after the Russo-Japanese War, and that Prince KATSURA finally cooperated with SUN WEN after the Russo-Japanese War to establish the fundamentals of Asia policy. This problem is most important in deciding Japan's international policy in the future. The time has come, I think, when the Premier must, without seeking refuge in such phrases as "non-intervention", adopt an attitude towards the present international situation with the firm resolution and belief of his predecessors, in this moment of internal and external emergency. The content of the above-mentioned advocacy of the Korean Invasion has been diversely discussed. However, SAIGO's advocacy of the Korean Invasion appears recently as a Cabinet record in "What about the war?" by Colonel SHIMIZU, former chief of the Press Subsection, War Ministry. Since this is short, I shall just read it.

"In the 6th year of MEIJI /1873/ when the so-called Korean Invasion was clamorously advocated, SAIGO, Takamori, made a warning prophecy to the then Premier SANJO, Sanetomi, as follows:

'Listen, Premier, to what I say. The Premier of today is not the Premier of olden times but the Premier of the Restoration of the Imperial Rule, the Meiji Restoration. Whether Japan will continue as she is, a small country, or will become the country, over which a god's descendant reigns, including every nation, great or small, broad or narrow, as an Oracle of the Grand Shrine, all this rests on your shoulders.

'If Japan goes on at this rate, she can never become other than an island country. Now is a good opportunity. If we don't now step into the Asia Continent which is six times as large as Europe, we will certainly meet with great distress in the future. Korea and China are bluffing and never to be feared. Russia is, unless she always keeps the nation's attention focused on foreign countries, on the verge of collapse. She is far from dispatching a strong army for conquering Japan. If you do not listen to what I say, you will later have trouble twice as much as today or even more. No matter what trouble is involved, you must do what I now say, since this is Japan's Providence and mission. Therefore, by making Korea an outer fence and then using her as a base of operations, we will then be hand in hand with Russia.



'However, unless we wage war, we cannot well understand the adversary, so even if we have friendly relations, we have a superficial alliance, not a true alliance. It will break down with just a slight clash of interests. That things will go as I say is not according to Takamori's judgment. This is the divine will of our ancestors. As Japan is destined to this path, things become so sooner or later. As you are younger than I, you will survive me. Remember well what I have just said.'

From the internal and external standpoint Japan is now already, I am convinced, at the moment of deciding her attitude towards the international situation with a firm belief worthy of this Oracle at least. I hear that, maintaining close relations among the three powers of Germany, Italy and the Soviet, Germany is about to decide her present attitude on international relations. On the other hand some insist that, in view of the present world situation, there must be devised fundamental measures for settlement of the China Incident, by concluding a military or economic alliance among Japan, Germany, Italy and the Soviet. At any rate, we are now entering the period in which to decide fundamentally our world attitude. At a time when our national attitude is to be decided /in a manner/ worthy of the spirit shown by this great predecessor, with what resolution will the Premier, the most responsible man in our nation's government, face the present international attitude? I ask that.

State Minister YONAI:

Needless to say, our Empire is concentrating all efforts on settlement of the Incident. Under the cloak of these words 'settlement of the Incident', it is establishment of the new order in East Asia. For this purpose we adopt the non-intervention policy and are giving undivided attention to settlement of the Incident. Today this is a great mission for the Empire, I think. We are judging as far as possible the situation of every country in the world, and studying how to achieve this settlement of the Incident as early and completely as possible. Furthermore, Japan's path of expansion is not restricted to the north and south alone. Since she is growing steadily, I think Japan has the strength to expand in all directions everywhere.

Committee-Member YAMAMOTO:

At the recent meeting of the Committee of Accounts, MUTO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, spoke as follows:

"I think that we must mutually have the spirit of leadership that is common to all of us. As War Minister TERAUCHI once said in the Diet, in order to cope with international situations today, we must by all means sweep away individualism and all liberalism that springs from that individualism which respects individual interests, I think."

and then

"Even in peacetime, the mental attitude of individuals in economic competition must be that of rivalry on a national basis rather than on a basis of personal gain. I believe we are making progress that way."

and then

"War Minister TERAUCHI has made a remark that we must carry on by means of totalitarianism permeated by the concept of national structure."

"It may even be called the doctrine of the national structure."

and then

"If a political party pursues only party interests, neglects state affairs, and ignores the country, I think it must reflect upon itself and make amends at the earliest possible moment."

"If it does not reflect upon itself at all, I think that in this crisis we must by steps conformable to the law secure its dissolution."

This remark by a prudent and manly person like the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, MUTO, shows clearly in some respects how acute today's situation has become. I feel heartfelt agreement with his words, but this is not a new problem. A pamphlet "The Basic Principle of National Defense and Advocacy of Its Intensification" was published by the War Ministry in 1934. The gist of this pamphlet is that it is desired that the people divest themselves of the concept of a selfish individualistic economy, wake up to an economy based on morality, and immediately push on to build up an economic organization fit to attain to the ideals of the Empire; this spirit of leadership by the Army and the outline of various concrete policies are clearly announced therein. On October 10, 1934, the then War Minister HAYASHI told our colleagues, in the presence of the Chief of the Press Subsection, NEMOTO, that the content of this pamphlet was the general opinion of the Army, that the Army was evoking public opinion by this, had the will to carry it out, would make unceasing efforts that this be established as national policy, and was issuing a call to the Navy. This was also discussed in the Diet. In short, if this spirit had been realized in the organization of the state, and not been obstructed by the "maintain the status quo" faction, I am certain that such disgraceful affairs as the 5.15 Incident and the 2.26 Incident would not have happened, and we would have seen victory in the China Incident without fighting. There results a great economic contradiction, I think, in that the "maintain the status quo" faction rushed into the China Incident without understanding this great spirit. Such a problem as this is a fundamental problem in politics.

(The Chief of the Committee left his seat. A deputy, YAMAMOTO, for the Chairman of the Committee assumed the seat.)

A resolution on accomplishment of the holy war was recently adopted by the House of Representatives. "Co-operation as a body" in that resolution does not mean that all parties, which have different motives, will collaborate only formally, but that we Japanese, not out of liberalistic and socialistic



thoughts but in the light of the pure race in national structure and with a belief of saving and emancipating all of Asia, or still more all the world, are in great urgency to establish a Japanese national organization to which shall compile the admiration of all nations. Except by means of work involving ideas, military force, and economy, all resulting from this, it will be very difficult to win the hearts of the people. I am certain that for this purpose, if the Government, Diet and nation do not assume a steadfast attitude as a body by displaying the nation's great racial spirit and political unity based on the heavenly will, we Japanese cannot tide over this national crisis in domestic and foreign relations. I think it is inevitable that, without some common sense in this respect and in the great belief of saving the country, irrational actions will occur for the sake of the nation. We must go on with firm resolution. It is deplorable that there are many Cabinet changes during the war, but it is inevitable to change the Cabinet if it has no confidence to tide over a national crisis. I wish to get a frank and courageous answer on this matter. I shall stop now.

C E R T I F I C A T E

N.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. \_\_\_\_\_

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Signed at the House of Representatives on this11th day of August, 1947/s/ Takashi Yamazaki /seal/  
Signature of Official

Director of General Affairs Division  
of the Secretariat of the House of  
Representatives  
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Tsugio Tokai /seal/Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry A. Dolan, Jr., hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this14 day of Aug., 1947/s/ Henry A. Dolan, Jr.  
NAMEWitness: /s/ J.F. MunroeIPS Inv. Div.  
Official Capacity



Committee-Member MUGAMI

I would like to ask special efforts in carrying out particularly the third item -- the re-appointment of substitute teachers and retired teachers, as you have referred to in your reply. I have another question to ask the War Minister. As you know, the shortage today in the number of primary school teachers is very great, as a certain member of the Government Commission has just stated. At this juncture to begin with, I would like to have you bear this in mind. The number of students above middle school grade who were temporarily exempted from military conscription totalled 90,541 in the year 1936, 92,397 in 1937, and 96,014 in 1938. These figures were announced by the authorities in the Diet last year. As compared with the figures before the Incident, the figure for 1938 shows a shocking increase of 5,500 students who were as a special favor delayed from conscription. I imagine that these figures will increase to 90,000 to 100,000 or even exceed 110,000 during 1939 and 1940. In observing the various technical colleges and others of today, there are necessary students among these. And also in the technical field, there are those that must be exempted. However, I have a feeling that there are not a few who are enrolled merely for temporary exemption from conscription. This I will not affirm. However, from results of recent conscription examinations, there is a considerable increase in the adoption ratio, or the so-called service ratio of conscription examination of elementary school education and lower, who could not continue to higher schooling. If these figures were 50% before the incident, then the situation of compulsory military servicemen has today risen to 70 and 80%. I believe, at this instance, if even a part of these students were not exempted from conscription, and the regulation of Article 41 of compulsory military service law ("In time of War or Incident, particularly in the event of necessity, no exemption from conscription will be possible in accordance with the Imperial Ordinance") was applied by the government, three divisions of picked troops or an efficient army of four divisions can be raised instantly. The mere hearing of this would be a considerable threat to Chiang Kai-shek. This is the thinking of a simple man, but that is what I believe. However, I do not mean to say that such a privilege granted to students should be abolished. In this connection, I would like to ask the Minister; concerning such students, the Government is allowing the postponement of conscription on the ground that learning should be carried on. As I have previously mentioned, today there is a considerable shortage in the number of primary school teachers. To obtain 40,000 or 50,000, they would all be substitute teachers. It is questionable whether the education of the rising generation can be attained by the teachings of these substitute teachers. However, the Army revised the Conscription Law and there existed, until recently, a system of pardoning service after 5 months of active service for the primary school teachers. However, this system was revised

to two years. Of course, I agree to the purport of which the primary school teachers should be taught the Army life and other matters of the Imperial Army but I want the enforcement of this /revision/ to be delayed for say three years or two years beginning from this year, as today we are faced with the shortage of primary school teachers to educate the coming generation. Then, later, through the amendment of the Conscription Law, the short period active service system can be abolished, but for the present I think this is questionable. Consequently, firstly, in regards to this point, there are quite a number of students who are extended the conscription. How does the Army authorities feel about this? Secondly, aren't there any thoughts of prolonging the short period active service system? I would like a clear reply from the Minister in regard to these two points.

Minister of State HATA:

The inquiries upon the opinions of Mr. KOGAMI just put are indeed true. However, as regards to the opinion of whether it is not better to put more restrictions on the extension of student conscription, I do not think that the present situation has reached a point where conscription of students by the above measures must be made. Rather, for the present, I believe if it isn't better to look for complete satisfaction in the services of the future by subjecting the students to physical training and intent studies. Next the fact that the abolishing of the so-called short-period active service system will cause shortage in primary school teachers is true. To hear of the shortages recently of the primary school teachers is truly an unbearable anxiety for our country. I'm wondering if there isn't an unfortunate connection of complexity and delicacy between the reduction of primary school teachers and its applicant and the overall boom of the world, and in your opinion, this thing of immediately returning to the short period active service system is I believe not so appropriate. This abolishing of the short period active service system is the revision of the so-called conscription law, and since this is important it was revised as a result of careful consideration. And, presently there is no intention of reviving this again through so-called spirit for universal military service.



C E R T I F I C A T E

U.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. \_\_\_\_\_

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Signed at the House of Representatives

on this 11th day of August, 1947

Takashi Yamazaki  
Signature of Official

Director of General Affairs  
Division of the Secretariat SEAL  
of the House of Representatives.  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry A. Dolan, Jr., hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
14 day of Aug., 1947

Henry A. Dolan  
NAME

Witness: J. F. Munroe

IPS Inv. Div.  
Official Capacity

Doc. No. 3030-K  
/3rd Meeting of the 4th  
Section of Budget Committee/  
19 Feb. 1940/

Page 1

Committee Member MIZUTANI:

I would like to ask the War Minister a question and that is, there were exchanges of questions and answers concerning the problem of the Army's political voice between a fellow committee man and the War Minister in the general meeting on the Budget the other day. In connection with this I wish to be more certain about a few points, so I again would like to trouble the War Minister for an answer.

The first point is: What was meant by a part of the staff of the War Ministry to which the War Minister referred as assistant organs at the time of the controversy? Namely, to perform necessary researches and discussions are deemed natural in line of work, and to make political remarks under the responsibility of the War Minister is termed a natural organ in line of work. Actually, what does this thing called staff of the War Ministry designate which is referred to as its assistant organ? Do you mean the Military Affairs Bureau? Or does it also include the Information Board? Or a part of the Mobilization Plans Bureau? For example, does it include the War Plans Section, etc.? Or are there others? I wish to have these points a little more clarified.

Minister of State HATA:

While what Mr. MIZUTANI just now indicated included, for instance, the Military Affairs Bureau and the Information Board, I think they would also, as a staff of the Minister would naturally be included in its sphere. If there are others deemed necessary, and the problem of speaking arises, it would be up to the Minister to decide at that time, as I have stated previously. This is how I think.

\* \* \* \*

Committee Member MIZUTANI:

In connection with the problem I think there might have been two indistinct points in the foregoing controversy. One is the complication between the controversy over voice in political matters and that of the so-called participation in politics. And the other is I believe there is regret as to why there was no distinction in the foundation of the organization whereby a part of the organ is able to voice politically. My information is limited, and I do not know the organization of the Army in detail, but in examining the present controversy a little, it is needless to mention at this time the fact that the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau was organized after the 2.26 Incident, but I have the understanding that as a duty of the staff of the Military Affairs Bureau, such things as negotiations with the Imperial Diet,



items concerning the general national defense policies, propagation of national defense, thoughts, counter-plans, etc., are clearly listed on the Army Organization. Hence, I believe this problem of authority which enables part of these organs to voice politically may be solved plainly by clarifying this fundamental concept of national defense which is specified in the Army organization. Consequently, firstly, as a procedure, I would like to trouble you for a clear reply as to what National Defense is, and where should the basis for National Defense be set.

Minister of State HATA:

The meaning of this defense has heretofore been hotly debated as to whether it is in a broad sense or in a narrow sense but our idea of national defense is, of course, the defending of our country against enemy attacks and invasions, on a basis of consolidated national power which includes military power, politics, economy, thought, and other material and immaterial elements, and the policy of revealing the ideals for establishing our nation, while removing the various obstruction on the execution of our national policy. These in general constitute our interpretation of national defense.

\* \* \* \* \*

Committee-Member MIZUTANI:

If so, I think I can construe the answer of the War Minister as meaning, in other words, that the national defense means armed warfare "plus" the general political strategy which includes political warfare, economic warfare, ideological warfare, propaganda warfare, and all other such warfares. Then having understood that point, what I would like to think of is, from the standpoint of the Army, there must be opinions about the question of whether or not it would be fortunate for the sake of the Army to manage, or to be obliged to manage, not only the armed warfare, but general political strategies as well. I think there lies the cause of many problems to arise at present in that, while at this critical juncture of the present Chinese Incident when the general political warfare must be brilliantly and effectively developed for an overwhelming victory of the armed warfare, there is vagueness in the construction of the national political power, or shall I say the structure of the national political power, which should be able to develop the general political strategy to cope with such an overwhelming victory of the armed warfare. For instance, the other day, the War Minister said in reply to the interpellation of his colleague, Mr. HOSHI, that the strengthening of the wartime organization was very necessary and the social condition was still not efficient. The War Minister further said, in effect, "I agree whole-heartedly with Mr. HOSHI in that in order to cope with this difficult situation, we must put political, economic, military, and all other matters on the wartime organizations; and as for ourselves, we too are not thinking that the present internal social situations in general are in the state

of satisfactory condition; and I hope from the bottom of my heart that both those at home and at the front will manage things, materially and mentally, in the same spirit and with a resolution of being engaged in the holy war." Then the point I would like to ask is that, what, in wartime is the political structure from the point of view of undertaking political strategy which will enable a harmonious amalgamation of the commonly called war strategy and the political strategy. Instead of the abstract words as answered to Mr. HOSHI, I would like a more thorough and concrete reply as to this point, that is to say, that such and such a wartime organization is desirable; that the Army would easily be able to exert its effort to armed warfare if in such a way a national political organization can be set and the national political power be constructed; and I would like to have it made a little clearer what is meant by wartime organization which will enable us to bring this China Incident to a perfect conclusion by having the so-called war strategy and political strategy mutually united. As an extension of the answer to Mr. HOSHI, I think these are the points which must be clarified, and I wish to hear the War Minister's opinion on this point.

Minister of State HATA:

The national defense which we are thinking is, as I have just now mentioned. It goes without saying that after all, now is the time when we must settle this Incident by mobilizing the total national power. Therefore, there is no need to say that the Army would like to carry out the Incident by raising the total national power and to establish the new order of the East Asia. However, in carrying out such a program, the standpoint of the Army must be pretty well considered; at any rate on the part of the Army, armed warfare comes first, and then, to other economic, political and ideological aspects, we will extend our support and cooperation to the utmost. In short, the Army puts the armed warfare as its main objective; and for other things it would cooperate and support in order to settle this Incident by raising the so-called total power. I am thinking of proceeding from this standpoint.

Committee-Member MIZUTANI:

Now, in the conclusion of the problem, I think we should distinguish strictly between the expression of political views by the Army and the problem of the Army's so-called meddling in political affairs. In the discussion thus far the interpellants have become confused and those who replied, if you will pardon me, have not made a clear distinction, so that point has not been clarified at all. Under the present wartime conditions when the military must undertake complete responsibility for settling the Sino-Japanese Incident fundamentally and now when the vast portion of the whole budget relates to the Army, I think that, from the above circumstances and from the official organization to which I have referred above, the Army's concern over political affairs and its expression of political



opinions is natural. However, I do not believe that I can by any means state, as a conclusion, that the Army's so-called meddling in political affairs is justified because of that. For instance, there is a representative opinion among the people that is as follows: Speaking frankly, it is rather at the time of a change in government than in normal times that the people are anxious about the so-called participation in political affairs by the military. It is the supreme authority of the Emperor to order the formation of a new Cabinet. The one ordered to form a Cabinet should organize the Cabinet freely without interference from others. If we view past developments, it would be difficult to say there are no traces of Army interference in the formation of a Cabinet. The military, themselves, would probably not deny this. It is natural that in the formation of a Cabinet in wartime, the person who forms the Cabinet should respect the will of the Army and take pains not to conflict with the Army. However, the Army should refrain from positive interference and harping. We hope that the Army will consider this "point". I am not one who denies absolutely the fact that the so-called political influence of the Army has become overwhelming since the Manchurian Incident. However, there are some people, shall we say, "liberalists" colloquially speaking, who are extremely displeased emotionally with the above fact and take the attitude of opposing and finding fault with everything proposed by the Army. I think that this too, is very wrong. But, on the contrary, there are other people, who, colloquially speaking, are Army "yes-men". They agree with everything done by the Army and whatever they do is right. I think that the attitude of such people should also be flatly rejected. The mission of the present so-called political parties and so-called politicians under the wartime structure is to declare as right whatever is rightly proposed by the Army which actually has this great political influence and support it to the utmost. However, if there is ever the slightest mistake, they should take the attitude of requesting the Army, in the name of the people, to make a reconsideration and to have them proceed in the right direction. I believe this is the grave duty of the politicians and the political parties of today. On this point, I think that the Army, which actually has political power, must never be an Army which brings fear to the people or which is feared by the people. I feel keenly that the Army must maintain its strength by all means on the one hand, but must be loved sincerely by the entire nation, on the other. Although I am a so-called mediocre statesman, at every place and at all times, this has been the attitude which I have consistently taken from the beginning to the end. Consequently, as a so-called general conclusion to the present problem of the Army's meddling in political affairs, I think that the expression of political opinions by the Army is proper from the standpoint of the circumstances and the government system previously mentioned. No one can deny this. However, as previously expressed, if such a situation should arise at the time of a change of Government, in the name of the people, and also from the standpoint of the Army, which must be intimate with the people, it will definitely not be a blessing for the Army and the people. I think it will be very satisfactory if we can obtain a definite answer from the War Minister concerning

the problems of the so-called true expression of political views by the Army and the so-called Army's meddling in political affairs.

State Minister HATA:

Therefore, there can be no doubt that the people are all soldiers as it is well expressed by the words "oneness of the Army and the people." Especially, to tide over the present situation, it is extremely necessary that the Army and the people should unite solidly into one body. If viewed from this standpoint, the problem of meddling in political affairs would naturally be settled. We are now striving with all our national strength and progressing toward a holy war in order to realize HAKKO-ICHIU, the great ideal of the founding of our country. Therefore, it is our eager wish that we can serve our country best to attain this objective. I hope that you will fully appreciate this. Therefore, as to the so-called meddling in political affairs, the margin between meddling in political affairs and the expression of political opinions by some is, as you just stated, very unclear. Unclear as it is, the Army is generally acting from the above-mentioned standpoint. As for my opinion, according to Mr. MIZUTANI's view what is called meddling in political affairs is entirely the business of the War Minister and the expression of political opinions also is the duty of the War Minister. However, as to the so-called administrative matters, which are a part of politics, the scope of the expression will change by itself. In short, since the War Minister oversees all those matters, supervision and guidance should be given according to the circumstances or the situation at that time. On this, I am firmly convinced.



## C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. \_\_\_\_\_

### Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Takeshi Yamazaki hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Director of General Affairs Division of the Secretariat of the House of Representatives and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 1940, and described as follows: Minutes (Shorthand) No. 3 (dated Feb. 19, 1940) of the meeting the 4th Section of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives in the 75th Session of the Imperial Diet. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): \_\_\_\_\_

Signed at the House of Representatives on this  
11th day of August, 1947.

Takeshi Yamazaki  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Director of General Affairs  
Division of the Secretariat of the  
House of Representatives.  
Official Capacity

Witness: Tsugio Tohei

### Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry A. Dolan, Jr., hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
14 day of Aug. 1947

Henry A. Dolan, Jr.

Witness: J.F. Munroe

IPS Inv. Div.  
Official Capacity

Doc 3030-k

豫聞集 第三回

昭和十五年二月十九日

○水谷委員 陸軍大臣ニ御尋、上ノイ、下アリマスガ景慕ニ于  
身總會ニ於キマス陸軍、政治決定問題ニ関シテ同  
僚議員ト陸軍大臣ト同ニ回答が取交ハサシマスアリマス  
ルガ、此ニ関聯シテ一ニ問題ニ関シテ天ノ少シ明瞭ニ  
置キマスト思ヒマス。重キ大臣、御答辯ヲ煩ヒマス。思  
フニ、アリマス。

第一其ノ其ノ際回答ニアリマス。陸軍大臣、仰シヤ陸  
軍大臣、輔佐機関ニ陸軍省一部、職員、即チ必要  
ナル研究討論ヲ為スコトガ職務上当然トサシ、政治上、発言  
ヲ陸軍大臣、責任、下ニ為スコトガ職務上当然ト機関  
トサシ居リマス。其ノ輔佐機関ニ陸軍省、職員トシ  
マス、一何ヲ指ス、アガ、或、軍務局ヲ指ス、今ア  
ガ、或、情報部ト云フ、アガ、或、整備局、一部例ハ  
戦備課ト云フ、合シ、アガ、或、ハ、以外ニ何カアリカ、  
シ、事、突、天ノ少シ明瞭ニシテ載キマス。ト思ヒマス。

○田國務大臣 只今水谷君、指摘サシマス、例ハ軍務局、  
情報部ト云フ、アガ、アリマス。是ヲ所謂大臣、幕僚  
トシ、当然其ノ範圍ニ入ル、天ノ少シ思フ、アリマス。其ノモ  
其ノ、以外ニ於テ必要アリトシマス。其ノ時ニ発言スル、  
カト云フコトハ、先程申述スル、通り、大臣ガ其ノ時決  
メキマス。アリマス。斯ク考ヘテ居リマス。

No. 1









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[illegible][illegible]

No. 2

一、本報之宗旨，在於報導事實，指導輿論，以促進社會之進步，及國家之繁榮。  
 二、本報之方針，在於公正、客觀、誠實、負責，不偏不倚，不黨不派。  
 三、本報之方針，在於報導事實，指導輿論，以促進社會之進步，及國家之繁榮。  
 四、本報之方針，在於報導事實，指導輿論，以促進社會之進步，及國家之繁榮。  
 五、本報之方針，在於報導事實，指導輿論，以促進社會之進步，及國家之繁榮。  
 六、本報之方針，在於報導事實，指導輿論，以促進社會之進步，及國家之繁榮。  
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 九、本報之方針，在於報導事實，指導輿論，以促進社會之進步，及國家之繁榮。  
 十、本報之方針，在於報導事實，指導輿論，以促進社會之進步，及國家之繁榮。



1893年3月31日


本報自開辦以來，承蒙各界愛護，不勝感荷。茲因本報館址狹窄，不敷應用，現已遷往新址。凡我閱者，請向新址接洽。此佈。

本報館啟

400-3030-K









Doc. No. 3030-L  
/5th Meeting of the  
Settling Committee/  
4 March 1940

Page 1

Committee Member H.L.I.:

Since the War Minister seems to be very busy, I should like to ask questions only on important points. Since the outbreak of the Incident we have reaped glorious war results through the bitter fighting of the loyal and brave officers and men of the Imperial Army. Nevertheless, in actually looking at the execution of the diplomatic policy of our country which should, as a matter of course, be consistent and run parallel with these war results, we can perceive many inconsistencies although the foreign affairs authorities say that our policy is the Imperial Way diplomacy or positive diplomacy. Concerning this point, I stated my convictions to Foreign Minister ARITA the other day and also asked him questions in regards to concrete problems. Unfortunately, however, the Foreign Minister did not give me any answers to the questions we asked him. In short, I feel that although we might desire such splendid diplomacies as the Imperial Way and positive diplomacy which our country must, by all means, actively carry out. We can not expect this from the existing Foreign Ministry authorities.

If we proceed under these conditions, would not the splendid war results achieved at great pains become in vain? Would it not come to a grievous result in which 100,000 departed souls of the loyal dead would have to weep in vain in the vast plains? Concerning these points we cannot help but feel deep concern. We hope that the War Minister will, without fail, place due consideration on these points, and when diplomacy is exercised outside, it must of course be a single system of complete national unity. Although it is a matter of course that diplomatic negotiations are handled by foreign affairs officials, as I have just told you, the minds of our present foreign affairs officials are not made up. To what extent have the foreign affairs authorities actually executed the Imperial Way spirit, and to what extent do they comprehend this spirit? Since we are truly deeply concerned, I think that we must have the Army urge and encourage the foreign affairs officials in regards to the establishment of our diplomatic policy and in regards to our foreign policy. We must have the Army face the world after careful deliberation. On these points, I should like to hear your opinions.

State Minister H.L.T.:

In this moment of gravity, it is needless to say that the close harmony of so-called military strategy, government policy, and especially diplomacy is indispensable. The Army has no other intentions but to proceed whole-heartedly to end this holy war by following our national policy and the great policy of concluding this Incident.

Committee Member HATA:

I understood the War Minister's firm determination. As has been mentioned just now, we are deeply concerned in our diplomacy. The battle has been won. Up until now, there have been repeated instances in which although winning the war, we had to fight another battle at the same place because we failed in diplomacy. That we do not want to repeat this China Incident, is the request of we people. With regards to diplomacy, it is our fervent desire that you will proceed with greater concern.

And next, it is needless to say that in order to attain the objectives of the Incident, the strengthening and reforming of the domestic organization should be planned and consequently, there is need for the carrying out of necessary revolutionary government policies.

In connection with this, we learned from the newspapers that, at the time of the formation of the YONAI Cabinet, the War Minister gave instructions to the entire Army that the Army itself felt fully the necessity of such policies. To this, we are in complete agreement. But generally speaking, though the carrying out of revolutionary policies is easily advocated in theory, the difficulty of practicing them is apparent when we view the attitudes which have been taken by the Cabinets succeeding the HIROTA Cabinet. After the 2.26 Incident, the HIROTA Cabinet was formed and it advocated the drastic reformation of the entire administration. However, it accomplished nothing. Since then, although there were five Cabinet changes, i.e., the FOMOYE Cabinet, the H. Y. CHI Cabinet, the HIRANUMA Cabinet and the ABE Cabinet, the revolutionary policies which we people fervently desire were not realized. The reason why these revolutionary policies cannot be carried out is that there is entrenched an influence, a strong conservative influence, that obstructs our attempts to carry out a reformation. Therefore, if we intend to carry out needed revolutionary policies, we must clash with this conservative influence that tries to check us. Consequently there arises mutual attacks and frictions within the nation. It is because of the fear of this mutual attack and frictions, that successive Cabinets have not been able to carry out the reformation resolutely. However, the situation at home and abroad has gradually become pressing and since Japan of today is afraid of the trifling and slight mutual attacks and friction within her country, she can never carry out her reformation and the country will be faced with dangers. If the government authorities are really determined to carry out the reformation for the sake of the country, I think that they must do it by suppressing, overcoming, and surmounting such meaningless internal frictions. War Minister HATA requested the carrying out of revolutionary policies immediately after the organization of the Cabinet, but we entertain a feeling of great anxiety as to whether or not this YONAI Cabinet, which is considered conservative, can carry out these policies. Moreover, we can not find out the contents of the so-called Army's revolutionary policies. In regards to the contents, the outline, etc., of the Army's revolutionary policies, at this time, I shall be content



to be informed of only its general outline. If I can request the disclosure of its general outline, I think it will be satisfactory.

Minister of State HATA:

That the Army is definitely not satisfied with the present social situation in general was explained in my answer to Mr. HOSHI's inquiry the other day. In regards to the further strengthening of the system of national mobilization in order to completely settle the incident and to promptly and completely prosecute this holy war, we firmly believe that our efforts must be redoubled. I would like to proceed under this policy.

### C E R T I F I C A T E

#### Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Takashi Yamazaki hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Director of General Affairs Division of the Secretariat of the House of Representatives and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_ pages, dated \_\_\_\_, 1940 and described as follows: Minutes (Shorthand) No. 5 (dated March 4, 1940) of the meeting of the Audit Committee of the House of Representatives in the 75th Session of the Imperial Diet. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): \_\_\_\_\_

The House of  
Signed at Representatives on this  
11th day of August 1947.

/sgd/ Takeshi Yamazaki (seal)  
Signature of Official

Witness: /sgd/ Tsugio Takei (seal) Director of General Affairs  
Division of the Secretariat of  
the House of Representatives  
Official Capacity

#### Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry A. Dolan, Jr., hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
14 day of Aug. 1947

/sgd/ Henry A. Dolan, Jr.  
NAME

Witness: J. F. Munroe /sgd/

IPS, INV. DIV.  
Official Capacity

4 March 1940

Committee-Member IMAI:

As to the War Minister's sincerity, I understand him very well. Although I understand him, I think he does not give a satisfactory answer to the question I have just asked him, but I don't wish to press any further due to lack of time.

What I'd like to ask next is the essentials of settlement of the Incident. Diet-Member SAITO's question, which gave rise to controversy by accident the other day, has much to do with the essentials of the Incident solution. The people know very well that the establishment of a new order in East Asia is based on the three principles: neighborly friendship, common defense against communism, and economical co-operation. Although they know it well, they do not know at all the concrete essentials that forms with this as a principle. Presently, this may be owing to the situation in which the people cannot be informed, and, too, it may be too early to let them know. However, I think the Government should abolish the principle of secrecy as much as possible and assume an attitude to let the people understand this insofar as possible. Although it is a fact that the people entertain doubt and feel uneasy concerning the outcome of these essentials, I certainly think this is also responsible for the measures the government has heretofore taken. The problem of the Yangtze River opening, for instance. The KONOYE Statement says that Japan will recognize the sovereignty of China. However, confronted with the establishment of a new Government in the near future, the announcement that Japan now will open the Yangtze River, leads to a doubt that it may mean Japan's disregard for the sovereignty of China and contradiction to the KONOYE Statement. Moreover, if the Yangtze River should be opened, British ships will sail the river freely. American ships will also sail freely. The authorities of the Foreign Office are actually saying, repeatedly and apologetically at this date, that this is not a diplomatic transaction with the U.S., but I shall take it upon me to say that it is a mere excuse. Since the beginning of the War I have twice been in North and Central China for inspection. The Japanese forces just barely retraced up the Yangtze River, three hundred ri from Shanghai to Hankow, with sacrifices and hardships beyond description. Furthermore, one thousand several hundred mechanical mines or anchored mines severely victimized the Japanese forces in the Yangtze River. Who on earth supplied them? Oh, it is evident, of course. When I consider these facts, I think the Yangtze River should not be opened so imprudently, in view of the Japanese soldiers' blood-squeezing efforts and pains, and even if opened, ships of such hostile-like Third Powers as Britain and America should not be made to pass through freely. Nevertheless, when the people think so and the Government suddenly announces that Japan will open the Yangtze River, then they cannot understand what is what and it leads to suspicion and uneasiness.

Here, I would like to ask a question. The KONOYE Statement clearly reads that when a new Chinese government is established, Japan will not request her to restrain the rights and interests of any bona fide Third Power who will co-operate with the understanding for the new order. But



Diet Member SAITO stated in his interpellation the other day — "We cannot understand what is meant by a new order, and we cannot make out what is what if the rights and interests of Third Powers are freely recognized." But I think it is apparent that it is a misunderstanding by Mr. SAITO. The KONOYE Statement does not so express. It is alright for us to recognize the rights and interests of a Third Power who co-operates for the establishment of a new order, but we are firmly convinced that we cannot recognize the rights and interests of a Third Power who hinders the establishment of a new order, harboring hostility against Japan. What opinion has the military authorities in this respect? I would like their definite answer.

Minister of State HATA:

As to the opening of the Yangtze River, as you know, the Japanese forces there began to make preparations for its opening on 10 December of last year, because there arose situations in which there were no objections to the opening for their military operation. This was the announcement. Therefore this was an arrangement by the Army and Navy at the spot, and taking into consideration their claim from the military operation, the conditions of peace and order, and others, they thought time was ripe to open it, and as it could be opened, they began to make preparations. I hope you will fully understand that our forces did it quite independently. Therefore, we have never promised when to open and what to do. Accordingly, I think there is no objection to the Japanese forces' opening it, and after having made preparations I think it should be, sooner or later, opened, but I think the military should decide the time when it can be opened.

Committee Member IMAI:

We will recognize the rights and interests of a Third Power who will co-operate with an understanding for the establishment of a new order, but we must not recognize the rights and interests of any Third Power who will be opposed to it. This is the question I have just put to you. Please answer it clearly.

Minister of State HATA:

If our forces there admit that they must not open yet, because, for instance, the hindrance of a Third Power is extremely severe, and the Third Power impedes the military operations and activities for keeping peace and order, then, I think the military will not open it.

Committee Member IMAI:

It seems to me that your answer has adhered too closely to the opening of the Yangtze River, but I am asking for your interpretation in regards to the rights and interests of Third Powers related in the KONOYE Statement. We will recognize the rights and interests of a Third Power who will co-operate in the establishment of a new order, but, both the new Chinese Government and Japan must not recognize the rights and interests of a Third Power who would harbor hostility against the new Government and Japan and hinders the establishment of a new order. This is how we think. How about you?

Minister of State HATA:

I need not say that the point is clear, and it is our fixed policy that we will go hand in hand with anyone who will co-operate with us for the solution of the Incident and we will positively reject anyone who will hinder this.



W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. \_\_\_\_\_

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Signed at the House of Representatives on this

11th day of August, 1947.

/s/ Takashi Yamazaki SEAL  
Signature of Official  
Director of General Affairs  
Division of the Secretariat  
of the House of Representatives  
Official Capacity

Witness: Tsugio Takei /s/  
SEAL

Statement of Official Procurement

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Signed at Tokyo on this14 day of Aug., 1947.Witness: /s/ J. F. MUNROE

/s/ HENRY A. DOLAN  
NAME  
I.P.S. Inv. Div.  
Official Capacity

Meeting of the Budget Committee on  
17 Feb 40 in the House of Representa-  
tives, 75th Session of the Imperial  
Diet.

Minister of State KOISO:

Just now, we heard Mr. SHINOHARA's speech which was very rich in content and invaluable. In his conclusion, he presented two questions. I think that the first; the problem as to whether we should advance northward or southward is of considerable importance. To what I am now going to say, you might say that it is somewhat a departure from reality or tell me not to speak so fanatically. However, I cannot positively say that I will not make this departure. Therefore, I think that I should like to make my speech brief.

As the original recognized national policy of Japan, we have been firmly handed down from generation to generation, what is called HAKKO-ICHIU, TENGYO-KAIKO /TN: An interpretation of this is: the resumption of the mission handed down to the Emperors by the Goddess AMATERA/, or RIKIGO KENTO /TN: An interpretation of this is: making the universe the Emperor's Capitol/. Although this is expressed in various words, it means after all, world wide expansion with the truly magnificent spirit and culture of Japan which we firmly believe. Emperor MEIJI said in the first year of his succession, "I will govern this country myself, give all you subjects freedom from care and finally cross the seas and spread our national glory throughout the four corners of the world." I believe that this great sentence expressed in such a manner, did after all, place its underlying note on this belief. In explaining what this means, it means that in our recognized national policy, advancement in any one direction was not considered in our advance to the north, south, east or west. In other words, Japan's destiny is advancement in all four directions. However, the question as to which direction should be emphasized in the successive generations is, I think, the problem in this generation. If that is the case, what is best in this present generation is as stated in Mr. SHINOHARA's speech. I might be somewhat dogmatic, but the Japanese race is surely a divine race. However, I think that there is a mixture of Eskimo, Ainu, Indonesians and the MIAO of China. I think that the present YAMATO /Japanese/ race, which controlled and unified these many races, has the quality to advance in any direction and to grasp and assimilate any culture whether this fact is known or not. As to the larger portion of the lineage of the YAMATO race, if we say that it is undoubtedly a divine race, or that it is the TAKAMAGAHARA Race; it is within the province of scholars to say that it can endure the hot zone or the cold zone. Therefore, I think that we should hesitate to make a positive statement. I am one person who agrees entirely with Mr. SHINOHARA on that point. Fortunately, however, I believe that we must consider that because we possess Indonesian blood, we also have the capacity to progress towards the south. Therefore, I believe that at present, it is indeed a natural tendency for us to proceed towards the north and the continent because of the main feature of our racial composition. However, a nation cannot stand without defense, just as administration cannot stand without economy. It has clearly been proven



by ancient history of civilization, that if we are to quickly and readily obtain economic rights and interests, it would be more convenient to do so by sea transportation rather than by overland routes. Therefore, I again believe that just as Mr. SHINOHARA stated, we must proceed bravely towards economic development in the south where resources are thought to be in abundance. Therefore, at the present, we should follow the increased tendency of the race towards the continent and the north with more than ample economic development and at the same time, we shall extend our economic rights and interests towards the south with all our might. In this, I think that the necessary movement of the race is absolutely indispensable. In short, I believe that after all, since we should not emphasize any one direction in our northward or southward advancement, we should advance as indicated in Mr. SHINOHARA's talk.

The second question was. When what would you do with the cultural system of Japan which is rapidly advancing towards her world policy? Although I might sound very impertinent, I am one of those who become indignant just to think that there are so few fellow countrymen who completely understand the spirit and culture of Imperial Japan. Japan has been rapidly absorbing Western culture and products for seventy years since the early MEIJI Era, and at present, in the Imperial Universities which are called the highest seat of learning, what does Article I of the University Ordinance say? It says, "The university shall teach the theories in the arts and sciences and their application which are important to the state as well as to inquire into the most profound mysteries as its object". Up to this point, it is all right but it only says further that, "Simultaneously, it should consider the building up of the character of the people and cultivate national thought". The graduates of the said highest seat of learning are leading all the cultural systems in the Empire of Japan.

I think that we must stand more firmly on the spirit that dates back to the very beginning, reflect back to the days of the founding of Imperial Japan and then begin our investigation from the Three Great Oracles handed down by the Sun Goddess AMATERA. With the Emperor revered as the nucleus of the entire nation, and with the attitude of complete national unity, that is, with the moral principles of God as the main principle, and by adding to this oracle, which refers to rice, and important material, we must support the Emperor's destiny which is as everlasting as heaven and earth. I think that this is the underlying principle of the Japanese Spirit. In other words, I think it is the very source of the spirit and culture of Japan. I further think that this is the way of God and also the way of the Emperor. It is commonly said that there is unity between ancestral worship and government. I believe ancestral worship means that God and men enter the same mental frame of mind. And I think that administration is the deciding of all matters with this frame of mind. If the spirit and culture of Imperial Japan which has such an underlying thought, is carried forth, it will spread throughout the world and some day might naturally become the main current of thought in all parts of the world. Speaking from this

point of view, China's rule of righteousness such as Confucianism, Buddhism, or Christianity are all derogatorily speaking, inferior, and I believe that they must all be fostered in the Imperial Way, and the spirit and culture of Japan. Then as to the second question, where should the cultural system of Japan, necessary for world policy, be placed? I believe that this is a question which can be solved by seeking the very origin of Japanese spirit and culture, and judging all our actions, by standing on this source.

I am very sorry that I was so wordy.

#### C E R T I F I C A T E

I, SATOW, Tomoo, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of the Cabinet, and that as such official I have custody of the document attached hereto consisting of 2 pages, dated 17 Feb 1940, and described as follows: Speech of the Minister of State KOISO at the Meeting of Budget Committee on 17 Feb. 1940 in the House of Representatives, 75th Session of the Imperial Diet. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet Secretariat.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
25 Day of September, 1947.

/sgd/ T. Satow  
Signature of Official

Witness: /sgd/ K. Makimura

Secretary of the Cabinet  
Official Capacity

#### Statement of Official Procurement

I, HENRY SHIMOJIMA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
25th day of Sept., 1947

/sgd/ Henry Shimojima  
NAME

Witness: /sgd/ Richard H. Larsh

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity



## 豫算委員第一分科會議錄 第二回

昭和十五年二月十七日

○小磯國務大臣 只今條原君カラ非常ニ内容ノ豐富ニシテ  
貴重ナル御話ヲ承リ、最後ニ三點ニ関シテ御質疑ニ接シタノ  
デアリマスが、其ノ第一ノ御質疑ノ北進ヲ南進カト云フ問題ハ、  
相当重要性ヲ持ツテ居ルモノト思ヒマス。私ガ是カラ申上ゲマス  
コトハ、ドウモ現實ヲ離レタ、ソナ神憑リノヤウナコトヲ言フナ、斯  
ウ仰セニナルカモ知レマセヌガ、併シドウシテモソコニ觸レマセヌト申  
上ゲラレスト思ヒマス。簡單ニ申上ゲタイト思ヒマス。元來日  
本ノ國是國策トシテ、古來五々ノ父祖ノ時代カラ牢固トシテ傳  
ハツテ居リマスハ、絃一字ト申シマス。カ、天業恢弘ト申シマス。六合  
兼都ト申シマス。カ、色々ナ御文字ニ依ツテ表ハサレテ居リマス。ケレ  
ドモ、兎モ角モ此ノトモニ立派ナ吾々ノ確信スル日本精神文化ヲ以テ  
世界的ニ擴大ヲ行クダ。明治天皇ガ明治元年ニ「親ヲ四  
方ヲ經營シ汝僥兆ヲ安撫シ遂ニ八萬里ノ波濤ヲ拓開シ國威  
ヲ四方ニ宣布シ、斯ウ云フ風ニ仰セニツタノモ、畢竟ソコニ基調  
ヲ置カレタ一大文章デアルト拜察スルノデアリマス。ト云フコトハ何ヲ  
意味スルカト云ツト、北進トカ南進トカ東進トカ西進トカ、一方ニ偏ス  
ルト云フコトハ國是國策ノ上ニ於テ考ヘテ居ラヌ、換言スレバ、日本  
ノ行ク所ハ東西南北進ダ、唯併シ其ノ時代々々ニ於テ、何レニ重  
點ヲ形成スベキヤト云フコトガ、此ノ時代ニ於ケル一ツノ行ク道デアラ  
ウ、斯ウ思フノデアリマス。ソレナラバ現代ニ於テドウシタラバ宜  
イカト云ツト、是ハ條原君ノ御話ニアリマシタ如ク、私ハ少シ妄斷

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10.2

二にカモ知しやが、日本ノ民族ト云フモノハ固ヨリ天孫民族デアリ  
 ーストモソコニ「エスキモ」モ「アイヌ」モ「インドネシア」モ支那ノ苗族  
 モヤリ入ツテ居ルと思フデアリマス、斯ウ、如ク多クノ民族ヲ統制  
 シ之ヲ一丸ニテ行ツタト云フ今日ノ大和民族ト云フモノハ東西南  
 北トノ方向ニモ進ミ得、如何ナル文化ヲモ把握シ同化セシメ得ルト  
 云フソノ素質ヲ意識スルトセザルトニ拘ラズ、持ツテ居ル存在  
 タと思フデアリマス、ソレナラバ大和民族ノ大部分、血ハドウダ、ソ  
 レハ紛シモナイ天孫民族デアリ、高天原民族デアルト致シマス、  
 是ハ暑イ方ニ堪ヘ得ルカ、寒イ方ニ堪ヘ得ルカト云フト、是ハ  
 學者ノ領域デアリマス、私共、斷言スルコトヲ憚ラナレバ  
 ナラヌ所デアルト思ヒマス、其ハ、點ニ於テハ、私ハ、條原君御  
 意見ニ全然御同感ヲ表シタリ、入ナ、デアリマス、唯、併シ  
 幸ニ「インドネシア」ノ民族ノ血ヲモ吾々が持ツテ居ルト云フコトハ  
 當ニ南ノ方面ニ向ツテ進展シ得ルト云フ性格ヲモ併セテ持ツテ  
 居ルト、斯ウ考ヘネバナラヌト思ヒマス、ソコデハ、民族体系ノ主流  
 ト云フモノハ、兎テ角ニ現代ニ於テハ、北及ヒ大陸方面ニ向ヒテ行ッ  
 ト云フコトハ、是ハ自然ノ趨勢ヲト思ヒマス、併シ、國防ヲ離シ、國  
 家カナイト同シヤウニ、經濟ヲ離シ、政治アリマス、又、ソコデ經濟  
 的權利利益ヲ成ベク早ウ容易ニ之ヲ收メヨウニスルナラバ、陸  
 上交通ニ依リヨリ、水上交通ニ依ツタ方が便利デアルト云フコト  
 ハ、古來文化史ノ明證スル所デアリマス、テ、隨テ多クノ資源ヲ  
 包藏シテ居ルト思ヒマス、南ノ方面ニ對シテ經濟的進展ヲ  
 勇敢ニ進メテ行カネバナラヌト云フコトモ亦條原君御説、通  
 リト思ヒマス、隨テ、今ニ於テハ、大陸及ヒ北ノ方面ニ向ツテスル所、



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民族ノ増勢ト云フモノアリ餘程ノ十分ナル經濟的發展ヲ之ニ  
伴ハ之タルベキデアルト同時ニ南ノ方ニ向テハ非常ナル努力ヲ  
以テ經濟權益ノ擴張ヲヤリテ行クソレニ必要ナル所ノ民族ノ  
移動ト云フコトハ必然的ニ又ヤリテ行クモノ云々爾ニ云々居ル  
デアリマス之ヲ要スルノニ南ノ方ニ北ノ方ニキカト云フモノハ一概ニ方ニ  
偏シテ極論スベキモノニアラズ又ヤリテ條原君が言ハレタヤリテ  
趣旨ニ於テ建シテモデアル所ノ所ニ居リテ云々

第二段ハ然レバ世界政變ニ適達スル日本ノ文化体系ト云フ  
ノカト云フデアリマスが私ハ甚ダ注意氣多甲上ナルモノデアリマス  
ケレドモ一休皇國日本同胞ニ之ヲ今日本ニ皇國日本精神文  
化ト云フモノヲ得テ居ル人ノ果シテ幾人デアルカト痛憤スル  
人デアリマス明治初年以來七十年猶タトシテ批判檢討ノ進  
テ西洋文物ヲ吸收シ來リサウシテ今日最高學府ト言ハレ所ノ  
帝大ニ於テ其ノ大學令ノ第一條ニ何ト書キテアリマスカ「大學ノ國  
家ニ須要ナル學術ノ理論及應用ヲ教授シ其ノ發展ヲ究  
スルヲ以テ目的トシ此處ニテ人ノ道ヲ示スルモノ無キ人格ノ陶冶及國  
家思想ノ涵養ニ留意スベキモノトス」ト云フ程度ニ示サテ居  
ル其ノ高等學府カウ出テ居ル所ノ人々が總ニ於テ皇國日本ニ  
於テル文化体系ヲ「リード」シテ居ルモノウシテ私ハ其ノ報本反始精  
神ニ立脚シ皇國日本ノ肇國ノ當時ニ振返リテサウシテ天照大神  
ノ御下シニテミタ三大神勅カラ檢討ヲ始メテ天皇ヲ中心トシ奉  
ル此ノ君國君民不ニ體ト云フ境地ニ於テサウシテ奇鏡ト稻穗ト  
神勅デアリマス云々云々惟神ノ大道ヲ主体トシ奇鏡稻穗ヲ又カ

No. 3

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No. 4

重要なる物資デス之ヲ添ヘテ行クト云フコトニ依ツテ天壤ト共ニ  
窮リナレバキ皇運ヲ扶翼スルヲ行クノカト云フコトが日本精神  
ノ基調ヲト思フ一デアリマス言無キヲ換ヘテ言ベシガ日本精  
神文化ノ源泉カト思フ一デアリマス是ガ即チ惟神ノ大道ヲモアリ  
天皇道ヲモアルト思フマデ祭政一致ト云フコトヲ能ク言ヒマスガ祭  
ト云フコトハ神人一体ノ境地ニ入ルコトヲ云ヘマス神人一体ノ境地ニ入  
ルヲ考テ以テ一切萬事ヲ決裁シテ行クト云フガ政事ヲ云フカト思  
ヒマス斯ク云フヤウ考テ基調トス即チ皇國日本ノ精神文  
化是ニ在リ得テ行ク是ニ在リ世界廣ク雖モ何時カハ總ニ此處ニ  
自然ニ合流シ來ルベキモノデハナカヌウカ是カヲ言ヒマスト支那ニ於  
テハ王道、如キ儒教、如キ佛教、如キ或ハ基督教、如キ總ニ  
思フ言ベク低級ナモノアリ總チカ皇道、日本精神文化ト云フモ  
ソノ中ニ育ヒ來ルト云フ風ニナラズニナラズト思ヒマスソノ字第三  
御質問ニ仰セナリト云フ日本、世界政策ニ必要ナル文化体系ト云  
フハ何處ニ置クノカト云フコトナリマスバ、如ク日本精神文化ト云  
フモノ源泉ヲ探ス其、源泉ニ立脚シテ吾々一切ノ行動ヲ律  
スルト云フコトニ依リテ初メテ之ヲ解決シ得ル問題デアルノカト云  
フ風ニ考テ居リマス鏡古ヲ弄ヒテ之ヲ相濟シマセヌ



1900. 3030-N

證明書

又書局 市 号  
國際警察部 市三〇三〇N号

典據及公正國元證明

余、佐藤朝生、余が下記簽名於、即々同國事務官トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノト、並ニ該官更トシテ余が茲ニ添附スルモノ、二頁「成」千九百四十七年、昭和二十二年、九月二十五日附下記題名、即々千九百四十七年、帝國議會衆議院豫算委員會議錄、小磯國務大臣答辯、文書、係官任居ルモノトテ茲ニ證明ス。

余、更ニ添附記録、又文書日本政府、公文書トシ、並ニ右下記名稱、又部局、公文書類、又綴、部トシテ證明ス。右ノ上、綴番号又引用、其他公文書類、又綴、於此該文書、正現所在、公文名稱、已特記ス。

內閣官房

千九百四十七年、昭和二十二年、九月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官更署名欄	佐藤朝生 (佐藤)
右、若、公的簽名	內閣事務官
證人	坂村慶治 (坂村)

公六年ニ國元證明

余、HENRY SHIMOTAJIMA、余が聯國最高指揮官、總司令部ニ關係シ、且、並ニ記題、又文書、余が聯國日本政府、上記署名、要旨、今、元々、トテ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十七年、昭和二十二年、九月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名欄	Henry Shimotajima
右、若、公的簽名	國際警察部調査官
證人	Richard H. Larch

20.5

IPS DOC. NO. 3030-Q (corrected copy)

Exh No. 3640

EXCERPTS FROM THE MINUTES OF THE 25th BUDGET  
COMMITTEE MEETING OF THE 75th DIET, 22 MARCH 1940

\*  
\* \* \* \* \*

MEMBER INADA:

I would like to know if the War Minister and the Foreign Minister concur with the arguments for the dissolution of political parties and for the return of foreign concessions (in China) put forth by Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, MUTO, at the Account-Settlement Committee yesterday and the day before yesterday.

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361



第一類第一號

決算委員會議錄 第二十五回

昭和十五年三月二十二日ヨリ抜萃

稻田委員 陸軍大臣並ニ外務大臣ニ於カレマシテ  
ハ、一昨日並ニ昨日武蔵軍務局長ガ決算委員會ニ  
於テ答辯シテ居ラレマス、政黨解散論、並ニ租界  
返還論等ニ對シマシテ、御肯定ニ相成リマスルカ  
ドウカ承リタイト思ヒマス。

Nov. 30 30 Q.